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MICHAEL SHAPIRO: My name is Michael Shapiro. I am with the US
Patent and Trademark Office, the Office of Policy and International Affairs. It is
my delight to be the moderator of this panel, U.S. Copyright Developments. I
think my first task is simply to introduce our distinguished panel. I'll turn to that
right away. First, we have David Carson, who is the copyright claims officer at the
US Patent and Trademark Office. Then we have Kevin Amer who is director of
the copyright team at the US Patent and Trademark Office. I'm also pleased that
Josh Simmons from the firm of Kirkland & Ellis is able to join the panel with us.
Rounding out the panel, we have Jennifer Pariser, I hope I have that right,
Motion Picture Association in Washington, DC, and Sandra Aistars at the Antonin
Scalia Law School, George Mason University. I think we have a potpourri of
topics today. Given that, my recommendation is that we proceed in course and
take questions immediately after the presentation rather than save them up for the
end. Is that agreeable to everyone? Hearing no objection, I turn the floor over to
David Carson who will basically tell us how he is earning a living these days.
DAVID O. CARSON: Thank you, Michael. One small correction. While I
was once a colleague of yours at the US Patent and Trademark Office, I am now
at the US Copyright Office, which is where the Copyright Claim Board resides.
You just fell into old habits there, I think. Everyone, I'm very pleased to be here to
talk about the Copyright Claims Board or CCD, which will be opening its doors
in a few weeks. I can't give you a precise date but it's coming very-The CCB was created pursuant to a law that was enacted in December of
2020 called the CASE Act or the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Act,
which directed the US Copyright Office to establish the CCB as an alternative
forum in which parties may voluntarily seek to resolve certain copyright claims.
While there's a very long history to how the CASE Act came about, I don't have
time to get into that. I at least can tell you why we have a CASE Act. It was
basically designed to address a problem that I think a lot of people recognize for
quite some time, that if you have a copyright claim that is of relatively low value,
as a practical matter, there's probably nowhere you can go to get your dispute
resolved.
Up until now or up until a few weeks from now, the only place you can go
to resolve a copyright dispute is federal court. That's not cheap, it takes a long
time, there's a lot of process involved, and for many litigants, it simply isn't worth
it, either because they can't afford to hire a lawyer to represent them, and if you're
representing yourself in federal court, you're going to have a very difficult time in
most cases, or the value of the case is less than the amount of money they'd have
to spend to litigate it. As a practical matter, many, many litigants are simply
priced out of the system.
The Copyright Claims Board is an effort to come up with a forum where
people can actually get those claims adjudicated, and can do so at a relatively low
cost with much less process and can even do it themselves. That's the idea and
that's what we're trying to come up with and offer to the public. After the CASE
Act was passed in December 2020, the Copyright Office immediately started to
implement it. It's done that in a number of respects. First of all, with a number of
rulemakings. You can see our implementation tracker on the side there of the
2

Session 6D
slide, which shows you what we've been doing so far. The rulemakings are bottom
half of that.
We published five notices of proposed rulemaking. In a moment, I'll show
you a slide and we'll talk about the specific ones that have come out now. We have
one left to come, which is our major one on active proceedings. That's a few
weeks away. Once that's published, then it'll be a couple of weeks and we'll open
up our doors. I can't tell you when yet, but it's coming soon. We have hired eight
full-time staff members that includes three copyright claims officers, as we're
called, rather prosaic name. Among us, we have almost a century of experience in
copyright matters. We think we've got a pretty good group of people who can give
you a fair and impartial hearing.
We know not everything, perhaps most of the things there is to know about
copyright, so it's going to be a rare issue where people come up or a case where
people come up with issues that we're not somewhat familiar with at least. That's
one of the benefits, I think, of the Copyright Claims Board. If you're in federal
court, you're going to draw a judge. You may or may not have ever had a
copyright case before, or you're going to go before a jury, which is going to be
pretty ignorant with respect to copyright. You're going to get here a panel of
people who actually understand the law.
That may or may not be good for you depending on your case, but at least,
you're going to get a decision by people who presumably know what they're
doing. We've been working on the technology, which will have a built-in
electronic Copyright Claims Board where you can participate virtually and file
claims virtually. When I say we're opening our doors, they're virtual doors. We
have nationwide jurisdiction, but you will never come into our offices. It's all
online which makes nationwide jurisdiction a lot easier to deal with. We're
developing a lot of educational materials. Our website has already launched. I'll
show it to you in a moment and more will be to come as we head toward the
launch.
Let's move on to the next slide. Here's an overview of what we can and
can't do. In contrast to federal court where you can get however much you can
prove in damages, potentially millions of dollars if that's what you can prove, and
where you can get up to $150,000 in statutory damages, you can get much more
modest relief before the CCB. You can get total damages of $30,000 in one
proceeding no matter how many claims brought. Statutory damages limited to
15,000 per work. That's 10% of what you might get in federal court. We have a
streamlined discovery system, virtual hearings and conferences, as I said.
We only have three kinds of claims; copyright infringement, claims for
declarations of non-infringement, and claims for misrepresentations in DMCA
takedown notices and counter-notification. Most importantly, the CCB is a
voluntary forum. Neither party is going to be forced to litigate in the CCB.
Obviously, if you're the claimant, you choose to come to us or you choose to go to
federal court. If you're the respondent, you have an absolute right to opt out and
you can do so up to 60 days after you have been served with the claim.
Here’s an overview of how we have implemented the rules. This is a brief
summary of the topics we have covered. Starting last August, we had a
3
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rulemaking on expedited registration procedures. One that, by the way, we just
revised with a few tweaks today. Nothing major but we're taking a look at if
you're interested in that process. We launched our designated service database of
rulemaking last month along with procedures for a blanket opt-out for libraries
and archives. No time to talk about that, but if you want to get into that in the
discussion, happy to do so.
A big one on initiating proceedings and related procedures last month as
well, followed by one on representation by law students, and representation of
business entities, which was earlier this month. Then the major one coming soon
on active proceedings, which covers everything that happens once you're past the
opt-out period and you have a lot of proceeding once everyone is involved. Let's
move to the final slide, which just shows you a shot of the ccb.gov website, which
is where you can go for information about the CCB. As you see there, a couple of
things just to point you to.
If you click on start or access a claim right now, you're not going to go
anywhere, but once we open our doors, that will take you to the electronic
Copyright Claims Board where you actually can file claims and look at dockets,
and ultimately, look at our final determinations once we get to that point, and file
all the other papers that you would also be filing in a claim. Service will also be
accomplished through the eCCB. Another thing to point you to is the Copyright
Claim Board handbook, which we're working on right now. We'll have at least the
early chapters, the ones you absolutely need, up by the time we launch. That's
going to be a plain English explanation of how to navigate the CCB.
If you read our regulations, you know they're written by lawyers, and
sometimes they're not the most accessible to understand. The CCB is going to
translate that into English. We're very far along in some of our chapters and our
next step for them is going to be to send them over to our Office of Public
Information and Education where they can translate it into English from the
lawyerly language we've drafted it in, although we've tried to make it plain
English in the first place. We're hoping it will be a very accessible and very
understandable system. With that, my time's up, so we move on to the next point.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO: That's terrific. I know our panelists do have some
questions so I will leave it to them to take the floor sequentially and begin to grill
David. Who would like to go first? Sandra.
SANDRA AISTARS: I'll jump in and start the so-called grilling, Jenney, if
you don't mind, since this is a matter that's near and dear to my heart as somebody
who has advocated on behalf of individuals and small businesses in the arts for a
number of years. First, I want to congratulate David and all of his colleagues for
all of the hard work the Copyright Office has done in this space, and for the
incredible work that they're doing now to get the CCB launched and working
within the aggressive deadlines that the CASE Act legislation sets.
One thing that I want to sound a little note of caution about is that looking
at the rules —I know the big one is still coming as David warned us —I worry a
little bit that the office may be doing maybe too ambitious of a job. That the rules
will be difficult not just for pro se parties to navigate but also, speaking as
somebody who works with students who are really hoping to represent parties
4
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under the law school rules before the CCB, I'm a little worried that it will be
difficult for clinics to obtain permission from our respective law school deans and
administrators of various types to take on clients before the CCB if the rules end
up being too complicated, and as complicated as initial indications suggest.
That's because, obviously, the more complex the rules are, the more
opportunities there are for students to make mistakes. The administrators
sometimes figure the risk might be not worth it for the educational experience,
especially if the risk is in making mistakes on administrative matters and the
students spend all their effort trying to get it right on procedural, administrative
rules, which are important, of course, but the students in an Arts & Entertainment
Advocacy Clinic have signed up to be taught how to counsel and represent clients
on copyright issues, and hopefully, maybe the mediation and the negotiation that
goes along with that.
I know you've indicated in your comments, and maybe elsewhere too, that
there'll be guidance from the Copyright Office to help with these matters, and that
the guidance documents won't be as complex and they will be additional,
independent, documents. That actually makes me more nervous rather than less
because I'm a little worried that agency guidance documents are the sorts of things
that prompt judicial challenges regarding agency authority to act. I am concerned
that perhaps the law isn't that clear on what constitutes a guidance document
versus something that needs to go through notice and comment. I wonder how
you'll respond to my worries on those points.
DAVID O. CARSON: Sure. Thanks, Sandra. I think most of your concerns
that you've expressed so far probably relate to what's going to be in the upcoming
active proceedings regulation. As you know, there's not a whole lot I can say
about that because it is in process. I actually can't tell you what's going to be in it
because it's not finalized although we were in a very bad stage with it, but there's
still a lot of stuff influx in it in any event. Even if I didn't know it was going to be
in it, my lips are sealed until it's out. There's only so much I can say. What I can
say is what you just said has been said in comments by a number of commenters
who submitted them to us. We read those comments, we take them seriously.
We're going to do our best to make the system as accessible and easy to
use as we can. A lot, I think, of what was in the notice of proposed rulemaking
and some of which may survive in the final rule is dealing with contingencies
because a lot of what you find in those rules is if this, then that. In most cases, the
this isn't going to happen so you don't have to get to the that. You got to plan for
contingencies.
It's not as though everyone in every case is going to have to deal with
every single regulation, but you've got to deal with those in the first place just in
case something happens. With respect to the handbook, the handbook, as best as
we can, it's going to be a translation of regulatory text into plain English. It's
going to have examples just to help people understand what we mean, but it's not
intended to supersede or override what's in the regulations, obviously, it's just an
attempt to try to make things easier. I guess everyone will be the judge of how
well we do on that once it's out, but that's the notion of the handbook.
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JENNIFER PARISER: I guess I have a somewhat more high-level and
conceptual issue with CCB. We certainly applaud the Copyright Office and all the
work it's done on this. The work, honestly, has been astounding with-- What is it?
Six different sets of rulemakings and comments and reply comments and writing
rules and rewriting rules. It's huge. We completely support the idea of a copyright
claims board that will hear small claims, but I think our notion of what this was
going to be when we advocated for a small claims copyright tribunal was that it
would literally be a copyright analog to small claims court where one can go to
prosecute their small claim.
Typically, you show up, there's no discovery, you might hand up a couple
of pieces of paper, the other side might do the same. Each side makes their
argument verbally to the presiding officer and a judgment is issued on the spot.
Copyright is complicated. No one knows that better than all of us, but I think the
idea was this was supposed to be a little bit more streamlined. Of course, the final
rules have not been issued on discovery, but unless there's a complete
re-envisioning of the whole process from the proposed rules, we have some
concerns.
As people probably know, there's two tiers. There's what I'll refer to as
small claims of $5,000 or less, and then claims above $5000 up to $30,000. Both
of them have substantial discovery envisioned for the claim. Small claims can't
have extra discovery beyond standard, but even the standard discovery is what I
think a lot of people would consider fairly sturdy set of discovery obligations.
Then in the larger claims, honestly, it's a complete document production calling
for literally everything that can relate to the claim, everything that can relate to
damages. It's quite extensive.
There are interrogatory requests. Possibly depositions, although that is not
envisioned for the typical case. We look at this and at the end of the day see a set
of discovery obligations that is going to make the cost of litigating in this forum
nearly as expensive as going to federal court. That's going to be a challenge, I
think, both for claimants and respondents. I think it really remains to be seen
whether this forum is going to present an attractive alternative for litigants given
that, but we're hopeful. We're here to support it whatever it looks like, but fingers
crossed that the discovery doesn't scuttle the whole affair.
DAVID O. CARSON: That's not the idea. I certainly think even if you
look at what was in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which is the only thing
that's out there right now, the discovery that was included in that, A, it tracks what
the statute talks about. We were dealing with a statute that told us about certain
things that it seemed to anticipate would be included in discovery. In our view
when we drafted it, we thought we were coming down with something that was
pretty stripped down compared to what you'd have in federal court.
Again, that was the notice of proposed rulemaking. I can't talk about what
might be in the final rule. We're dealing with a statute that seemed to tell us to do
certain things, and we're dealing with our desire to make it a stripped-down
system, and that's where we ended up at that point in time. Beyond that, I really
can't comment.
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MICHAEL SHAPIRO: I see that Steve Tepp has a question in the Q&A.
Can you read that, David?
DAVID O. CARSON: Hold it up. I'll just read it out loud because I don't
have time to figure out how to summarize it. A question about the technology
which he knows correctly is out of my control. I believe you don't want me
designing the technology. The interface that has been described sounds like the
current eCO registration application interface, which is not particularly modern or
user-friendly. Do you have a sense of when the library might apply more
contemporary tools such as interoperability to API tools? I can assure you that
this is not another version of eCO. It's much more user-friendly. That I can assure
you.
In terms of interoperability through API tools, I don't think that's
something you're going to see, at least initially. Steve, I know you have worked in
the Copyright Office, you know about how government works with technology.
Always behind the times, for sure, and resources are always limited, so we've
been moving heaven and earth just to get where we are. What will be launched
when we open our doors is going to be basically a one-size-fits-all kind of a
process. Whether we can open it up to API tools down the road, I certainly
understand the interest and we've certainly had internal discussions about that.
Beyond that, I just don't have anything more I can tell you.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO: Why don't we turn now to Kevin Amer. There may
be more questions for David as we round out the discussion, but for the time
being, let's shift gears to Kevin. Kevin is going to talk about Unicolors, the H&M
Hennes & Mauritz. Also known as Justice Breyer's swan song. Perhaps Kevin
will be able to let us know whether Justice Breyer is going out more with a
whimper than a bang.
Kevin Amer: Thanks, Michael. I appreciate the-- I assume the swan song
reference is a bird reference, which would be appropriate given this opinion and
Justice Breyer is questioning an oral argument. I wanted to talk about the
Unicolors case. It's been an interesting few years at the Supreme Court. From a
copyright standpoint, we've obviously had a number of cases. Then, of course,
coming up we have the Andy Warhol case to look forward to. This is a much more
technical and somewhat arcane issue that was presented in Unicolors, but very
important to copyright enforcement.
It has to do with Section 411(b) of the Copyright Act, which provides a
safe harbor for applicants to include inaccurate information on a registration
application. The statute says that a certificate of registration is valid regardless of
whether it contains inaccurate information unless two things. One, the inaccurate
information was included with knowledge that it was inaccurate, and the
inaccuracy of the information, if known, would have caused the register to refuse
registration. This case had to do with the first part of the statute. What does it
mean for someone to include information on a registration application knowingly?
In this case, Unicolors is a producer of fabric designs and it sued H&M for
infringement. The case went all the way through trial. The jury found for
Unicolors, and after the verdict, H&M moved for judgment as a matter of law
challenging Unicolors' copyright registration. Here's where it gets a little bit
7
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complicated. Unicolors had registered its fabric designs under the unit of
publication registration option at the Copyright Office. Under the Compendium at
the time, it's still true today, to register multiple works under that option, all the
works must have been published as a single unit. The current Compendium is
actually more specific. It talks about that the works have to be physically bundled
together.
There was some dispute about what actually happened in this case, but the
important point is there was some evidence that wasn't true with respect to
Unicolors' fabric designs. That some of them were offered to the public in a
bundle whereas others were just made available exclusively to certain customers.
The Ninth Circuit ruled for H&M and held that Unicolors had provided this
inaccurate information knowingly because it was aware of the factual
circumstance that the designs were not published all in a single unit. The court
said essentially that it was irrelevant whether Unicolors was aware of the legal
rule.
Unicolors said, "We didn't understand that there was this requirement, and
we didn't understand what it meant." The Ninth Circuit said that's irrelevant. All
that mattered was that they were aware of the factual circumstances, that is, that
some of the designs were offered separately from the others. The Supreme Court
took the case. The government submitted an amicus brief arguing for reversal,
essentially arguing that the Ninth Circuit had created a distinction between factual
knowledge and legal knowledge that wasn't supported in the law, that there wasn't
any basis for in Section 411.
The court agreed and it held that the safe harbor in 411 applies regardless
of whether the inaccuracy is based on a factual error or legal error. It went through
a number of factors, [including] the ordinary meaning of the word knowledge.
The court noted the fact that to complete a registration application, by statute,
applicants are required to include information that touches on legal knowledge
indicating, for example, whether the work has been published, whether it's a work
for hire. These are legal determinations. The court also noted that the legislative
history, and the government pointed this out in its brief, that just from a policy
standpoint, Section 411 was-There was not a lot of legislative history, but what history there was
indicated that the statute was intended to close loopholes, and essentially that it
could prevent enforcement of copyrights and avoid situations like this, frankly,
where after the fact, someone could challenge a registration requiring the plaintiff
to start the process all over based on an inadvertent legal error. One thing that the
government, I think, was a little bit concerned about was would this rule
encourage sloppiness in registration applications that could have a detrimental
effect on the public record?
If the standard is entirely what the applicant subjectively knew, does that
create bad incentives? The court took account of that and said normal principles
of the law still apply. For example, willful blindness, if there's evidence that the
applicant was willfully blind to an applicable legal requirement, that can be
evidence of that they actually were aware of the requirement.
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Similarly, other circumstantial evidence may undercut their claim that they
were not aware. The complexity or obviousness of the rule, the court said that that
would be relevant. The court didn't land on a knew or should have known
standard, but it did account for the possibility that circumstantial evidence or
willful blindness could be relevant in assessing the applicant's actual knowledge. I
think my time is up, so I'm happy to stop there and take any questions.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO: Great. I think the panelists certainly do have some
questions. Who would like to go first?
SANDRA AISTARS: I definitely have questions, but I don't want to step
on Jenny's toes.
JENNIFER PARISER: All right, Sandra. I'll come after you.
SANDRA AISTARS: My question, again, comes from the clinic
practitioner's perspective. I'll follow on where Kevin left off, which is you don't
want to introduce sloppiness into the registration record, but on the other hand
you don’t want to unfairly penalize artists or unsophisticated parties who
misunderstand highly technical matters in the history and legislative record of a
provision. I was watching this case with interest and wondering where are we
going with this opinion as I was reading it. My thinking as I finished reading it
was does this raise the bar on practitioners as a whole and on students in
particular? If an artist makes a mistake doing a registration pro se, is that one
thing? But are we going to have a higher standard for all others? And won’t that
in itself introduce confusion into the registration record?
If we're going to have a different standard for artists doing their
registrations, and maybe a higher standard for practitioners or students
representing them through clinical practices, I guess the other thing that I was
thinking as you were describing the facts of the case, you referred to the
Compendium which, of course, is a guidance document —
If it's not clear to somebody as they read the Compendium, what the rule
means, or if the Compendium changes over time, how should that affect our
thinking and analysis under this rule that the Supreme Court has announced? Not
to put too fine a point on it - but I am worried you might be suggesting that an
error in the Compendium, or a misreading or change of the Compendium could
potentially affect an artist’s property rights.
Kevin: It's a good question. I don't know that it's entirely clear from the
opinion. I do think it is true that the sophistication of the parties is going to be
relevant under the court's standard. To the extent that there is evidence that the
applicant was represented by counsel, for example, when they filled out their
registration application, I would imagine that would go towards a determination
of whether they are deemed to have known what the relevant rule was at the time
they filed.
It's an interesting evidentiary question. All of these cases are going to
require going back to the circumstances that existed maybe many years before
when the application was completed, what the applicant subjectively knew or
didn't know at the time. I take your point, I think it remains to be seen how the
standard may differ in the case of pro se applicants versus those who are
represented by counsel.
9
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SANDRA AISTARS: If I can just say one tiny little thing, the reason why
I insert not just pro se versus counsel, as a consideration in terms of the
sophistication of parties, but pro se versus clinic students versus counsel, is I think
there's a difference to keep in mind, because the whole purpose of having a
clinical program in law school is to have students learn by doing and also not to
have the professor replace the student's work with the professor's own work.
You're going to get something that's in-between pro se and experienced counsel
work from a student. You're going to have a student with some law school
training, plus the guidance of the professor and, hopefully, extra motivation of the
student, but you can't pretend that you're going to get exactly what you'd get if
you went to the professor. I wonder how you sort that out anyway.
JENNIFER PARISER: Just following up on what Kevin just said about
how it's going to basically invite an examination of what was in the filer's mind
and it might be many years previous, et cetera, et cetera, Even if all that stuff is at
hand, doesn't it mean that every case where this becomes disputed issue cannot be
resolved on a motion to dismiss and everything has to go to summary judgment at
that point? We are supportive of this decision and think it's the right one, but there
are some collateral damage that it's going to do to the streamlining of copyright
cases. Unfortunately, when you erase bright-line rules, everything gets a lot
harder.
Kevin: I think that's right. The procedural aspects of how this is supposed
to work are a little confusing, to be honest. The second part of the statute that I
mentioned talks about if the register would have refused registration, and then in
411(b)2 it talks about how, in any case where such an inaccuracy is alleged. One
question, I think, for the Copyright Office for a long time has always been does
that mean that anytime there's just a bare allegation of unknowing inaccuracy in a
registration, that triggers the obligation on the part of the court to refer the matter
to the Copyright Office? That doesn't seem to make sense.
The court's opinion seems to contemplate, I think, something like what
you're describing, which is that before that referral takes place, it would seem to
make sense for the court to have an evidentiary hearing to determine whether in
fact there was unknowing inaccuracy. One that's determined, then you take the
next step of referring it to the Copyright Office to see if it would have made a
difference in the registration decision.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO: Terrific. Just to note what this case is about,
factual inaccuracies, but also to note what the case avoided. That is the underlying
question of what is a single unit of publication. I suppose we'll have to wait
another day for the court to opine on that huge topic. No comment. [chuckles]
Kevin: Oh, yes. I'm sure that they'll have to come after the Warhol case
and transformative use.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO: Fair enough. I think if we've exhausted Kevin's
topic, we can now turn to Josh Simmons, who will draw our attention to the
ever-important server test and throw some light on its legislative history.
JOSHUA L. SIMMONS: Great. Thank you. I'm going to share a couple of
slides because being a litigator, I can't talk without slides. That's one of the things
that happens as you litigate cases. This is the server test. For those who are with
10
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us who may not be familiar, this was something developed in the Ninth Circuit as
a way of dealing with a situation where you had images online in the virtual
environment, you don't know where those images are coming from.
The Ninth Circuit basically said, in order to violate the American display
right, you had to actually have possession of a copy of the image that you were
showing to your website users. If you didn't have possession, you might have a
contributory infringement claim but you wouldn't have a direct infringement
claim against that entity. I can show you a little bit just visually what that
involves.
This is the Perfect 10 case. Perfect 10 was a nude modeling company or is
a nude modeling company. As much as I would like to show you visual images
from the case, I'm going to eschew that decision and instead show you pretty
pictures of dogs. This is actually an image of what the Google Search engine
looked like at the time of the case. You would have all these images which were
from Perfect 10's website. There were two issues. One had to do with the search
engine itself and one had to do with larger format images.
The images that were in the search engine results were an easy question on
the display right perspective because with Google server, there would be a request
from a user's browser. It would return some HTML, hypertext markup language,
and you'd get them and say, "Okay, the images are on Google server, we will
return them," and the court said, "Well, that's easy." That's a display right issue,
but found fair use, which we're not going to talk about. What the court found
more difficult was when Google was displaying these larger format images, it
didn't want to deal with that through a fair use lens and so instead, pointed out that
technologically there's still the request to Google servers, but where the images
that were being displayed full screen were coming from was actually Perfect 10's
own servers. They were returned and you'd get these big images of, in my
example, dogs, and the court said, "that is something different, that's not the
display right."
What we're seeing now is a number of courts in New York and in Texas
saying, "This does not make sense." This distinction that the court is trying to
draw doesn't make sense, and they're doing it in the context of embedding, which
is essentially the same, the case that's currently up at the Ninth Circuit, we're
going to start seeing briefing next month, Hunley vs. Instagram, LLC involved
websites that Instagram allows embedding of photographs that were uploaded to
its website. You have the same structure. You go to a third-party publisher website
where these photographs are embedded, then you get the picture directly from
Instagram. Instagram wouldn't be liable because you uploaded them, they have a
license, but so goes the argument that the people who were doing the embedding
on Instagram with Instagram's health, did not have a license and so the whole case
rested on the server test.
What I thought was interesting as I was thinking through these issues is in
both sets of cases, the Ninth Circuit cases and the New York and Texas cases,
everyone says we're doing a textualist reading of the statute. I thought what we
might do with our time today is just look at what the text says. Here's the text to
display. The copyrighted work publicly. We can start with what is a copyrighted
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work. We know from the statute that some rights like reproduction is the
reproduction of the copyrighted work. Similarly, display is the display of the
copyrighted work. You can contrast that with distribution of copies. When you
talk about display, we're talking about displaying, the thing that is then fixed.
Remember, a copy is the material object, the actual physical thing, the
copyrighted work that's being displayed as something that's created or the thing
that is fixed. In this context, it's a photograph, but it's hard to imagine what a
photograph would be absent a material object, but regardless, we can replace that
in our little statutory text and say, "It's to display a photograph," but it's not
necessarily the material object that is the photograph.
Then the question becomes, we're going to display it. What does display
mean? Display means to show a copy, copies back, there's the copy to show a
copy of it either directly or by any other device or process. You have this
expansive language about what display means. Now I'll note that display has
show a copy, but performance doesn't have that. The concept of copy doesn't exist
in the performance de definition and will come back to why I think that's relevant
in a moment. We can replace that in our little statutory text show by means of any
device or process a copy of a photograph publicly, and then we can talk about
what public means.
Here we've got some even more complicated texts, which the Aereo case a
number of years ago addressed some of transmitting or otherwise communicating
a display by any means. We can plug that right in and say, "To transmit or
otherwise communicate by any means or process showing by means of that, the
copy of the photograph." You have this concept of, "We're communicating
something to you that's going to show somehow a copy of this photograph," and
get even more complicated and talk about the fact that transmit also includes the
concept of communicating and by any means of device, you end up with
something more crazy like this, but perhaps that's the point is made that it's any
process, any device or process multiple times across the statutory text. Let's leave
that alone.
What did Perfect 10 say? Perfect 10 said that what this means is you're
filling the screen of a computer, antiquated language now, but filling the screen of
the computer and that you have to have the material object, Google didn't have the
photographs, and so they were not displaying the work. Indeed, they talked about
what Google really was doing is providing these HTML instructions that I
mentioned earlier, and that those aren't the photographs. Since you're not
providing the photograph, you're not infringing or violating the display right.
Now you've got all of these cases I mentioned, Texas and many in New
York saying, "We reject that test." The question is, who is right on that statutory
construction? The server test includes this language, not in the statute that you
have to have the photograph, and those cases would say in the definition of
displays by any means of any other device or process and the Google Perfect 10
case doesn't mention that language at all, so that can't be right. If you can cause it
to be shown by any device or process, then that should be the answer. The
problem also comes in with the question of the copy. Yes, the statute says copy,
but it doesn't say who's possessing the copy, just a copy. The courts such as the
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Nicklin point out that there a distinguishing between whether I have the copy or
you have it, that means that I can show a copy that you are in possession of, just
as I could show you holding a photograph in your hands.
The other, I think that point they point to is in Section 109C when you
actually have the ownership of a physical copy, the statutory text is actually quite
clear about when you're exempting the things that are possession and when they're
not. Those cases suggest you're not doing the right textual reading, you're reading
into the statute, this concept of possession that's not appropriate, but they're also
reading into the statute, this concept that you can show any copy and they rely on
various texts. The problem is that the text that often gets relied on is things like
this house report, this is all conceivable forms in each and every method, but this
is about the definition of transmission, as we just said, the definition that Google's
relying on is the definition of display, not transmission.
Like I said, it's to show a copy of it. What does that mean? People look to
Aereo for some guidance and said, well, Aereo said it's by any means or methods,
that should be our answer. In both of those situations, you just have to remember
that it's to show a copy in the display context. In the performance context as I
mentioned earlier, there is no copy requirement. When you look to something like
Aereo, which was a performance case, or you look to a definition of transmission
in the performance context, you're not wrestling with this statutory construction
issue.
The question that is going to come up in the Hunley case in the Ninth
Circuit, which is bound by the prior decision, so Corey whether the panel's going
to overrule Perfect 10, but to extent that there is a circuit slip brewing, the
Supreme court may take this up is who is construction do you believe? Do you
think that you actually have to have possession of the copy, or is it sufficient to
cause a process to be in place that results in the copy of the image being shown?
With that, I'll turn it back to the panel, and we can talk a little bit about what
people think of the statutory construction arguments.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO: Sure. Perhaps we'll just turn to the panelists right
now to pose their questions.
JENNIFER PARISER: I guess my first question is whether we think
there's-- I guess umbrella question, what is the Ninth Circuit going to do? Are
they going to cabin in anyway their prior ruling in Perfect 10, perhaps by limiting
it to search engines? Or do you think they're going to double down and say, "We
actually like this ruling, and we're going to apply it in this context even though
maybe we don't have to."
JOSHUA L. SIMMONS: Some of the New York cases have raised that as
a potential distinguishing factor that, Perfect 10 is in the search engine in context,
we're in embedding context now there's something different. Technologically, I
don't think there is a difference. The fact is the code is working the way the code
is working. I think a panel could try that. It's interesting to me though, because
when you read Perfect 10, they've really believed they're giving it a statutory
textual construction. They think that's what the language in the statute says. I
think a panel would have to do some either coming to terms with the facts that the
statute might not say what they thought it meant or it may have to be taken on
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boxed if they really wanted to reverse the Perfect 10 decision at the Ninth Circuit
level.
SANDRA AISTARS: I guess when I'm looking at these cases, I keep
thinking back to the origins of some of these disputes and as they started heating
up, one of the early conflicts was between Getty Images and Microsoft. and
concerned the image search embed widget that Microsoft was offering then with
Bing and it was a widget that did the same thing. It allowed you to link images in
such a way that they appeared to embed within your website a high resolution,
large size image. At least what Getty was arguing then was that the tool was not
being marketed as a search engine but rather a widget and it also happened to
compete with a new service Getty was trying to roll out. That case ultimately
settled and then Getty went on to promote its embed tool where it credited the
artist and it had functions like ad sales around the image and so forth or trackback
to the artist's site. Then other embed tools have followed, which have used their
own business modesls and some rely on their website terms of service to get
certain permissions from the people who use those platforms.
I think what I'm seeing at least is that there are a variety of issues that arise
from the fact patterns that come up and are more likely to come up in different
ways over time. I wonder whether the issue is that the exclusive rights in Section
106 that we like to say cover the making available right, that we're supposed to
implement here, maybe don't actually cover the making available right as
perfectly as we say that we do because if it did, then maybe we wouldn't have this
issue.
As you're laying out your interpretation, I was saying, "Display what? Is a
thumbnail a photograph? I don't know. Maybe it is maybe it isn't. Maybe that's the
answer to the question here. I don't know." What are your thoughts? Maybe I
would open it up also if Michael would agree to ask also David and Kevin who
have experience in this area. I know the copyright office did a study on this a
number of years back where they concluded that they didn't need to do anything
further. This obviously tees this same issue up again, I would think.
JOSHUA L. SIMMONS: My reaction is you're right, a lot of this stems
from some things that the actual actors are doing. There's this licensing structure
where when you upload your photograph to a social media platform or really most
platforms, you're giving them a license, oftentimes, that is a sub licensable
license. This case, The Hunley case, was teed up because there was reports that
there was no license granted. Then the third parties who were using this embed
tool were not licensed.
You could solve that through industry just by saying, "Okay, we'll just take
a license, and we'll give it to everyone using our tool." That ran up against what
you're talking about with Getty, where the photography industry didn't like the
idea by participating in Instagram, photographers, were giving up all of these
rights, and there was an entire business model around, we won't license any
photographs, we'll just use the ones on Instagram.
The good news for those photographers is Instagram has changed the
technology so they get to now elect whether their photographs can be embedded
or not. That's another industry solution. I think ultimately, the legal problem
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you're pressing on is do we have a making available right? The term
communicate, I didn't get into this, but comes from [Berne?] you're supposed to
be able to control communication to the public and making available.
Usually, we talk about that in the context of distribution and we've got a
lot of courts who don't think distribute copies means make them available. You're
right if you don't have it there and you don't have it in display, you end up having
some issues although the Copyright Office said otherwise. I think the copyright
office's view has been adopted by some courts and not others. I suspect neither of
our government representatives are going to say anything other than "Yes, the
copyright office did say that." [laughs]
SANDRA AISTARS: Well, maybe the question is, does the changing
landscape affect their views, because it's been years since the copyright office said
that, and the landscape of litigation is changing now. We had a server test. Now,
we may have a circuit split on server test applicability. We've got very different
fact patterns emerging. We've got industry solutions, solving part of the problem,
but not all of the problem. We've got licensing solutions being imposed through
terms of service that people never read. We've got other solutions being proposed
along the lines of, “Take my terms or get off the internet." What's the best solution
here?
JOSHUA L. SIMMONS: From my perspective, I think that there's the text
and then there's industry reaction to it. I think if you told the industry embedding
was now going to lead to infringement, I hope that it would find a way to make it
work, but it may not work in the way photographers want it to because there are
people who want this, and they've built their whole businesses around it.
I think if you get the textureless construction that the New York courts
believe in, then I think the natural reaction is for the service providers to say,
"Great, we'll take your licenses. If you want to participate in social media, you're
going to be giving these rights away." I don't know that that's the right normative
result, and I think most photographers would say it isn't but you see the internet
the way it is.
JENNIFER PARISER: Why can't everybody adopt some version of
YouTube's Content ID where the copyright owner shares in the revenue stream. If
they don't license, then they don't, but at least it's not give it away for nothing or
don't. There is a version of this story that involves profit sharing.
SANDRA AISTARS: Well, because Content ID isn't made available to
independents and small businesses.
JENNIFER PARISER: That too [chuckles].
SANDRA AISTARS: And in the instances where Content ID is made
available you often hear complaints that it is used as a negotiating cudgel, where
the terms of the agreement are not negotiable, artists have to sign up to additional
channels they don’t want to make available if they want access to Content ID to
protect their work against infringement on the main YouTube platform, or use a
URL by URL takedown notice model. That's, I think, how negotiations might turn
out for photographers if they seek access to automated tools too.
JENNIFER PARISER: That's fair, I guess. In my head, it's a working
version of content ID that is available to everybody on fair and reasonable terms.
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JOSHUA L. SIMMONS: What's interesting about this is in many of these
cases, the photographers, or at least, in this case, the photographers themselves are
the ones uploading to Instagram. There's not a situation where you have content
ID where it's an unauthorized copy uploaded to YouTube and then you're taking
share in that unauthorized use. It's an authorized use on the platform, but they
don't like that the platform's allowing this third party embedding or that there's
this other technology.
That's a little bit of the other part of the trickiness, which is, you could
elect not to upload your photographs, but then you're not participating in a really
important marketplace for photographers who really want to share their work and
are proud of it. Instagram is where a lot of the people who are looking at that
work are going now and they're concerned about it. That's the issue.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO: Just to mention that Carlo Scollo Lavizzari has a
comment in the chat. If someone would like to read it to introduce a European
perspective or I can do it.
JOSHUA L. SIMMONS: Carlos says, "The CGA EU case of VJ Buildcon,
K-U-N-S-T I don't know how you pronounce that throws up a related issue as to
whether TPMS can be used to control display/communication to the public and
found that is a legitimate, if not required control by the rights folder.
Technological protection measures a DMCA anti-circumvention concept. I think
we have that in the United States. The question though is in these circumstances
when you upload to Instagram, you can't have your own personal TPMS so it,
again, turns back to the specific situation where you're in a social media platform
environment, but you're right many websites, if you have your own website, now
you can have blocks that say if you're not looking at my website in the right way,
don't display the images. When you're hosting images on the backend of your
website, you can say, "If you're not seeing them through my website, then don't
show them."
Framing doesn't really that you still run into a framing problem. The direct
in-line linking, which was the issue in Perfect 10 can now be somewhat prevented
using that method and there are other technological methods you could employ,
but I just back into what Sandra's going to say, which is, but how is an individual
photographer going to implement all that and pay for it and prevent that use? I
don't have that answer.
SANDRA AISTARS: Well, I guess my other question is, how does that
not create the same problem as keeping off of Instagram creates. Aren't you just
setting yourself up for not being searched and indexed by Google and other search
engines. You're disappearing from the internet.
JOSHUA L. SIMMONS: Yes, you could theoretically allow Google to
search you and not allow third-party websites to do it. Technologically one could
do that, but it's still not ideal, and just turning back to the facts Perfect 10, one of
the issues with Google now is its search is one either you're doing it or you can't
say, "I want to be in the textual search results, but don't include me in image
search. Don't include me in whatever they're doing with all this information on the
backend," which I suspect is a lot more than we know. There's also that aspect of
you selecting out of what.
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MICHAEL SHAPIRO: Just to note that Carlo has a response.
JOSHUA L. SIMMONS: "CJ, you had the opposite problem you need to
limit somehow the display writing came up with the concept of new public." Yes,
I don't know the case, so I'm not in a position to comment on that. I don't know if
others have been following the EU you display right issues. We love our EU
friends though.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO: That's true.
JOSHUA L. SIMMONS: If we were together in public, we'd let you jump
up and tell us all about it but alas.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO: Next year in New York.
JOSHUA L. SIMMONS: Yes, exactly. At the end of Passover, it's a good
phrasing.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO: That's right. All right. I sense that we may have
come to a natural end. We have a few more minutes, but for those who didn't have
time to get lunch before this session, they could enjoy it but I'll pause here to see
if there's any final comments.
JOSHUA L. SIMMONS: One interesting thing to think about as David
was talking about the CCB is there's these issues that pop up where we're debating
and have I don't think we've come to an answer here among us. Are you going to
be able to provide guidance to people on the thornier copyright issues, or do you
turn that over to the copyright office and say, "Go look in the compendium, those
guys have the answer." How does the CCV work for these really, I don't know if
this is an infringement or not, issues.
DAVID O. CARSON: Well, we'll decide the issues that are presented to us
and we decide them. That's one place where the statute's pretty clear that it's the
board that makes the decision. We don't have to ask the register, how we're
supposed to decide. In fact, in particular cases, there's a Chinese wall between us
and the rest of the office so I'm not saying we're asking for authority issues and I
don't think we're going to be getting them every day, but if they're presented to us,
we'll do the best job we can to answer them. Now they're not whatever we say,
won't be presidential, because nothing we do is presidential, but it'll be worth
whatever's worth.
SANDRA AISTARS: You can refuse cases that are too complex - would
you decide an issue like this where we have a difference of opinion on the correct
law to apply between the circuits?
DAVID O. CARSON: Well, look, you present a server test issue to us right
now. One of the things we have to is figure out, I forget the exact statutory, a lot
of boots, but in what court would it have been brought?
SANDRA AISTARS: Right.
DAVID O. CARSON: Essentially, if it would've been brought in
California, I think we know what the answer is right now. If it would've been
brought in New York, we got a pretty good idea what the answer might be,
although we don't have
SANDRA AISTARS: Well, what if it could be brought in either? I live in
New York, Joshua lives in California or the other way around. Those are the two
most likely states in which things are going to arise, right? I'm an internet
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developer in California and Joshua is an artist in New York and we're suing each
other and we come to the CCB, what are you going to do? Both venues are
appropriate.
DAVID O. CARSON: Well, if you come to us, I guess you'll find out.
JOSHUA L. SIMMONS: It's going to be interesting. I think that's going to
be a really telling thing or you approach it from the justice Thomas' perspective,
you say first principles, right? He's articulating this view that we should just look
at the text, look at the constitution, look at the text.
DAVID O. CARSON: Well, we can look at the text for sure, but if we've
got binding case law and when we've got two plausible sets of case law to look at,
and if it really truly is a draw as to which one is the right one. Maybe, we've got
some flexibility. I don't know, but ultimately we're bound by precedent to the
extent that it's finding on us.
SANDRA AISTARS: Now we want to know what your answer is to
Joshua's presentation, David.
JENNIFER PARISER: We don't have a pending case so you're not
required.
SANDRA AISTARS: This has nothing to do with the rules. We just want
to know what your response is to Joshua's presentation.
DAVID O. CARSON: I thought it was an excellent presentation.
[laughter]
DAVID O. CARSON: Damn it, I love it.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO: Well, should we end with that comment?
SANDRA AISTARS: We all thought it was an excellent presentation, As
were yours, David and Kevin.
JOSHUA L. SIMMONS: Yes.
MICHAEL SHAPIRO: Diplomatically said.
JOSHUA L. SIMMONS: The other thing I'd just say is these complicated
issues come up frequently and copyright and I suspect next year will have a lot
more to say for those who keep coming back and I look forward to seeing
everyone in person for that.
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